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1 Introduction
This panel report represents another installment in the long-standing
litigation between Canada and Brazil over subsidization of sales of com-
muter jets by both countries. The report addresses a set of claims by Brazil
closely related to prior claims concerning the practices of the Export
Development Corporation as well as industrial policy entities in the
Canadian province of Quebec. Brazil specifically challenged certain recent
transactions where these federal and provincial entities provided certain
kinds of financing assistance in connection with the sale of Bombardier
aircraft (namely to Air Wisconsin, Atlantic Coast Airlines, Comair,
Kendell, and Air Nostrum). For the most part the panel applied existing
jurisprudence on export subsidies to the factual record. In particular, the
panel applied a ‘‘private investor principle’’, verifying in all instances
whether the conditions that were granted by the export development
and industrial policy agencies were more favorable than the conditions
that were available from alternative private sources. However, it is
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extremely difficult to provide an adequate commentary on the panel’s
comparison between the conditions available in the market and those
granted by the agencies because vital factual information concerning the
transactions in question has been removed from the panel report for
reasons of commercial confidentiality.
Thus, in our Report, we focus on several specific areas, largely of a pro-
cedural and preliminary nature, where the panel made apparently novel
findings of law that have some systemic or general significance for WTO
jurisprudence and practice.
Some preliminary comments on the general approach of the panel may
however be in order. It is striking that the panel paid a lot of attention
to the distinction between programs that leave some discretion to the
authorities granting subsidies which may be unlawful and programs
which instruct the authorities to do so. According to the panel, only
programs which instruct the authorities to grant unlawful export sub-
sidies are as such unlawful, despite the fact that the declared objective
of these programs is to grant export subsidies (which are likely to be
unlawful). Hence, everything appears as if the programs are not unlawful
because one can exclude that they may not pursue the objective that has
been assigned to them.
The apparent contradiction between the objectives assigned to the
agencies and the behavior that they are meant to pursue in order to
comply with the WTO framework is reinforced by the application of
the private investor principle. According to this benchmark, particular
loans and guarantees are lawful if they could have been obtained from
private investors. Here again, the behavior of the agency is lawful where
it mimics the behavior of private sources of funds – which suggests
that they should not have been public agencies in the first place or at
the very least that their public status (and the particular objectives that
they are supposed to pursue in light of this status) should be seen as
irrelevant.
Overall, one can thus wonder about the effectiveness of a legal frame-
work that imposes behavioral norms on an institution that are in contra-
diction with its ‘‘raison d’eˆtre’’.
This raises the broader question of whether the constraints imposed by
the SCM agreement are reasonable. A discussion of this issue goes much
beyond the scope of this chapter. It is worth mentioning however that
subsidies can sometimes be highly desirable (see Besley and Seabright,
2000, for a discussion) and that the blanket prohibition on export sub-
sidies contained in the SCM agreement may not be warranted.
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2 Jurisdiction of 21.5 Panels in Relation to Panels Seized of
a New Matter
In its Request for a Panel Brazil included claims related to the alleged non-
compliance of Canada with previous panel rulings. This was particularly
evident with Claim 3, which alleged: ‘‘Canada, in defiance of the rulings
and recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body, continues to grant
or offers to grant export credits to the regional aircraft industry . . .’’
Article 21.5 of the DSU provides: ‘‘Where there is disagreement as to
the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken
to comply with the recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be
decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, includ-
ing wherever possible resort to the original panel.’’ Canada argued that,
to the extent that Brazil was making a claim concerning ‘‘existence or
consistency’’ of measures taken to implement a pre-existing DSB ruling, it
was required to make that claim under 21.5, and thus that the present
panel did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate.
The panel responded in several different ways to this argument of
Canada. First of all, the panel observed that Brazil was not, strictly speak-
ing, asking it to examine the measures in question to determine their
consistency with a prior ruling of the DSB, but rather to determine
their consistency with provisions of the WTO SCM Agreement. In other
words, even though Brazil was asserting the inconsistency of Canada’s
measures with earlier rulings, it was asking the panel for de novo review of
those measures, not findings concerning their consistency with the earlier
rulings.
The problem with the distinction the panel draws here, upon Brazil’s
suggestion, is that, according the Appellate Body, it is precisely the role of a
21.5 panel to examine, in respect of measures that were the subject of
previous panel rulings, whether the subsequent conduct of the defendant
relating to those measures is consistent with the provisions of covered
Agreements (Shrimp/Turtle 21.5, para. 85, Brazil – Aircraft 21.5, para. 35.).
The logic of the panel here would seem to have the following result:
where a previous panel found a measure inconsistent with certain provi-
sions of the covered Agreements, and the defendant changed the measure
such that it now fell afoul of different provisions, not dealt with in the
original panel report, this would not be a matter for a 21.5 panel, but an
entirely new panel, based on new terms of reference.
If this were so, then a defendant could avoid the expedited procedures
under 21.5 simply by redesigning its measure so as to make it inconsistent
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with different provisions of the covered Agreements than those dealt with
in the original panel proceeding. It may be in part for this reason that,
repeatedly, the Appellate Body has made it clear that the 21.5 panel can
and must consider the consistency of any new or modified measure with
the covered Agreements, not just with the previous rulings and recom-
mendations of the panel.
Secondly, the panel noted that Brazil said it was simply seeking a factual
finding that since the adoption of the prior 21.5 report Canada had not
made any changes in one of the measures in question, the so-called
Canada Account. The panel relied on Article 11 of the DSU to simply
refuse to consider this question of fact on the grounds that it would not
assist in the panel’s determination of Brazil’s claims of violation of the
SCM agreement in the present proceeding.
This reasoning of the panel is rather hard to follow. Given that the 21.5
panel had found the Canada Account in violation of the prohibition of
export subsidies in the SCM agreement, a factual finding that the measure
was unchanged since that previous ruling would seem to have cardinal
importance for resolving Brazil’s new claim of violation in respect of the
same measure. It would mean that res judicata would arguably apply,
since the new claim of violation concerns a measure found, as a matter of
fact, to be identical to one previously ruled in violation.1
Where a measure is identical to one that has already been adjudicated
and is the subject of an adopted DSB ruling, it does not seem appropriate
for a later panel to assess de novo whether that measure is consistent
with the very same provisions that were the subject of the previous
1 See the India – Autos panel, where the first step in the analysis in determining whether
there could be res judicata was to consider whether certain legal claims and measures
already adjudicated were identical to those now before the panel. (paras. 7.83–7.103). The
India – Autos panel never reached the issue of whether res judicata actually applies in
WTO proceedings but began with investigating whether, assuming res judicata did apply,
the criteria of identity of claims and measures could be met in this particular case. Having
determined that they could not, the panel considered it unnecessary to provide a
definitive answer to the question of whether res judicata is available in WTO law. In the
Argentina – Poultry case the panel rejected an argument that res judicata applied with
respect to previous proceedings in a non-WTO forum, MERCOSUR, but it also seemed
to question whether res judicata could exist even as between an earlier and later WTO
proceeding. In Argentina – Poultry, the panel seemed to confuse the issue of whether the
res judicata could apply in later proceedings between the same parties on the same
matter, with the question of whether panel rulings have binding precedential authority,
i.e. are stare decisis in different matters between different parties (which of course they are
not).
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adopted ruling. This would be inconsistent surely with the principle of
finality of adopted DSB rulings, as between the parties. Thus, it was
arguably important, assuming that it was correctly seized at all with
the issue, for the panel to determine whether the Canada Fund was
unchanged, in order to be able to decide whether the matter was indeed
res judicata.
Thirdly, the panel, in attempting to distinguish the kind of claim Brazil
was making from a 21.5 claim, noted that ‘‘Brazil’s claims in this proceed-
ing do not concern the specific financing transactions ‘‘at issue’’ in the
[earlier] Canada – Aircraft case. Rather, different transactions are at issue.
Moreover, the legal framework under which the Canada Account is
operated has changed, as noted below’’ (Paragraph 7.18).
But the Appellate Body has made it clear that it is precisely the mandate
of a 21.5 panel to consider the measure as modified and applied subse-
quent to the original panel ruling (Shrimp/Turtle 21.5). This will normally
and naturally involve new transactions, to the extent that the application
of the measure is at issue. So why the existence of different transactions or
changes in legal framework would take the claims of Brazil out of the
jurisdiction of a 21.5 panel or make it appropriate for a new panel instead
to seize itself of the matter is entirely obscure.
One could regard the panel’s findings on the issue of the relationship of
its jurisdiction to that of a 21.5 panel in two different ways. The panel
might have been saying that there is some overlap between 21.5 jurisdic-
tion and the jurisdiction of an entirely new panel in cases where the new
complaint concerns both measures that were already adjudicated by a
prior panel and some measures that have not been the subject of the prior
adjudication. Or alternatively it could be taken as saying that certain
defined features of Brazil’s claim in this case would make 21.5 jurisdiction
inapplicable (new transactions, changes in legal framework). If it is the
latter, the panel’s ruling seems clearly inconsistent with the view of the AB
on the appropriate scope of a 21.5 panel’s inquiry.
On the former interpretation, the main systemic issue that arises is one
of forum shopping. This is especially so given the apparent avoidance of
the panel of res judicata, with the implication that it can review de novo
on-going conduct that was the subject, in part, of a previous panel ruling.
If a complainant did not find the ruling of a panel sufficiently favorable,
including a 21.5 panel, it could start a new proceeding and have a different
panel examine the same on-going conduct. While the new panel could
presumably only address those aspects of the on-going violation that are
subsequent to the first panel’s ruling, nevertheless the complainant might
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now achieve legal and factual rulings that lead to a recommendation that
the on-going measure be removed, thus achieving a prospective remedy,
which is really the only kind (generally speaking) the WTO dispute settle-
ment system can offer. Such forum shopping seems at odds with a
number of principles stated in the DSU, including the notion of prompt
settlement (3.3). One curb on such forum shopping may arise from the
ruling of the AB in Shrimp/Turtle 21.5 that where an adopted Appellate
Body report has found a measure or an aspect of a measure to be not in
violation, it is appropriate for the 21.5 panel not to re-examine the issue,
but to rely on the earlier finding of non-violation. Thus, in the Shrimp/
Turtle 21.5 appeal, Malaysia sought to re-open the issue of whether the
United States measure, as opposed to its application, violated provisions
of the covered agreements.
The AB had previously found that the measure itself was consistent with
the GATT obligations of the United States and it noted in the 21.5 appeal:
As we see it, then, the Panel properly examined Section 609 as part of its
examination of the totality of the new measure, correctly found that
Section 609 had not been changed since the original proceedings, and
rightly concluded that our ruling in United States – Shrimp with respect
to the consistency of Section 609, therefore, still stands. We wish to recall
that panel proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU are, as the title of
Article 21 states, part of the process of the ‘‘Surveillance of Implementation
of Recommendations and Rulings’’ of the DSB. This includes Appellate Body
Reports. To be sure, the right of WTO Members to have recourse to the
DSU, including under Article 21.5, must be respected. Even so, it must also
be kept in mind that Article 17.14 of the DSU provides not only that
Reports of the Appellate Body ‘‘shall be’’ adopted by the DSB, by consensus,
but also that such Reports ‘‘shall be . . . unconditionally accepted by the
parties to the dispute. . . .’’ Thus, Appellate Body Reports that are adopted
by the DSB are, as Article 17.14 provides, ‘‘. . . unconditionally accepted by
the parties to the dispute’’, and, therefore, must be treated by the parties to
a particular dispute as a final resolution to that dispute. In this regard, we
recall, too, that Article 3.3 of the DSU states that the ‘‘prompt settlement’’ of
disputes is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO.
(paragraphs 97–98)
Assuming this reasoning were also to apply to adopted panel reports, a
complaining Member would effectively be prevented from going to a new
panel in order to seek a ruling of violation that it was not able to get from
an earlier panel or AB decision, at least in respect of the same on-going
measure.
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3 The Mandatory/Discretionary Distinction and Brazil’s Claims
Brazil argued that the Canadian legal framework for export financing
itself violated the prohibition on export subsidies in the SCM Agreement,
inasmuch as that framework at least implicitly contained a mandate to
responsible officials to engage in export subsidization. In addition, Brazil
argued that the way the framework was applied was itself a violation of the
SCM Agreement. Finally, Brazil challenged the practices and policies
adopted with respect to a set of specific transactions.
The panel took a very formalistic view of whether the Canadian legal
framework mandated export subsidization, looking only at the face of
the Canadian law, which, not surprisingly, did not contain any explicit
instruction to officials that they must provide export subsidies of a kind
prohibited by the SCMAgreement. The panel choose to ignore, or consider
irrelevant to the issue of mandatory legislation, the various arguments of
Brazil that the legal framework had to be read in light of the policy
context, and the inherent nature of the activities that the export financing
entities were funded to engage in. In effect, Brazil was saying that when
one examined the overall nature of the Canadian government’s commit-
ment to export promotion, the mandate of for example the EDC went
along with very serious ‘‘cues’’ that it would be expected to confer a non-
market competitive advantage on Canadian exports.
Whether or not Brazil could make that case persuasively, the panel’s
exclusive emphasis on the form or face of the legal framework in assessing
whether it mandated a violation of the SCM Agreement is not consistent
with the more contextual approach of panels in other situations where
they have looked at whether there was a mandatory or regulative govern-
ment action in a particular situation, for example the Semi-Conductor and
Kodak-Fuji cases. A legislative frameworkmay mandate aWTO violation,
we would argue, even if none is required by its facial provisions, if the
legislative framework creates strong disincentives or incentives on offi-
cials or other actors to engage in behavior violating WTO rules. At one
level, the panel may be right that Brazil on the facts did not bear the
burden of proof in showing this to be the case. But at numerous points in
its ruling, the panel appears to be going further, suggesting that the case
must be made exclusively on the basis of the formal juridical character of
the Canadian law.
This may have been an instance where Brazil would have been better off
not admitting as apparently it did that the distinction betweenmandatory
and discretionary legislation should be dispositive of its claim against the
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Canadian legal framework ‘‘as such’’. That is, Brazil might well have
argued that the appropriate approach to state responsibility in a case
like this, which relates to intense competition in a single product market,
would be to employ the kind of test utilized by the panel in the S. 301 case,
namely whether the kind of legal insecurity with respect to WTO rights
created by the legislation is such as to give rise, in the context, to state
responsibility based on the legal framework alone. Certainly, Brazil would
have had a plausible case that the signals sent by the kind of programs
established by Canada as such were sufficiently strong as to induce
in Canada’s Brazilian competitor a strong sense that it could not rely
simply on market competitiveness to survive in the marketplace, due to
the likely intervention of Canadian authorities to provide financing that
would make the competing Canadian product more attractive to buyers,
all other things being equal. This sense of insecurity would induce
Embraer itself to invest resources in obtaining assistance from its own
government, especially given that Embraer could not know exactly what
Canada might, or might not, be offering to a given purchaser. In other
words, the legal insecurity created by Canada’s programs as such (and
reinforced by Brazil’s experience with their application to past trans-
actions) would undermine one of the basic purposes of the SCM
Agreement and binding dispute settlement in subsidies cases – to provide
a viable response to a party concerned about the export subsidy practices
of another party, which avoids the concerned party protecting the inter-
ests of its producers by resorting to competitive subsidization or
attempted ‘‘matching’’.
Brazil may have had a good argument that when one looked to
the Canadian legal framework, especially ‘‘as applied’’, one could dis-
cern patterned, norm-based conduct that attracts state responsibility,
even apart from individual discrete discretionary decisions on particular
transactions.
Because Brazil did not make this argument through the conceptual
optic in the 301 case, it was largely lost on the panel, especially what it
wouldmean to find a violation in the legal scheme ‘‘as applied’’ as opposed
to or distinct from violations arising from individual acts of discretion in
respect of particular transactions.
To recall 301, there the panel found that, although the scheme on its
face gave rise to legal insecurity of a kind such as, in the circumstances,
to attract state responsibility, the broader legal context was such as
to remove this insecurity, i.e. to give sufficient confidence that the
scheme would not be interpreted and applied as if it mandated a violation
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of WTO rules. Here, Brazil was making an argument that was sort of
a mirror image of that analysis – even if the formal elements of the
Canadian legal framework did not, on their own, create the kind of legal
insecurity that implicates state responsibility, when one considered the
pattern of application or interpretation of the export financing entities’
mandates, these schemes themselves did function such as to create the
relevant level of legal insecurity, thus justifying a finding of violation,
independent of the discretionary decisions of officials on particular
transactions.
4 The Relationship of the SCM Agreement to the OECD
Arrangement
The Panel revisited this issue, which has been addressed in earlier
panel reports and Appellate Body rulings in the Canada – Brazil aircraft
dispute.
Canada argued that its subsidies fell within the ‘‘safe harbor’’ of Annex I
paragraph (k) in the SCM Agreement, which provides that export credit
practices ‘‘in conformity with’’ the interest rate provisions ‘‘an international
undertaking on official export credits to which at least twelve original
Members of this Agreement are parties as of 1 January 1979’’, i.e. the
OECD Arrangement by any other name. According to Canada the OECD
Arrangement permitted matching of concessional interest rates, either
those offered by a competing country on the basis of provisions of the
OECD Arrangement, or as was relevant here, in derogation from the
Arrangement.
While not definitively concluding that the OECD Arrangement, taken
on its own, prohibits ‘‘matching’’ of derogations, the panel concluded that
it would be inappropriate to incorporate intoWTO law such an expansive
understanding of the OECD Arrangement.
The panel suggested that the matching of a derogation would itself
be a derogation and therefore not ‘‘in conformity with’’ the OECD
Arrangement, unless it were understood as a permitted form of self-
help. While the notion of self-help might be consistent with the nature
of the OECD Arrangement as a ‘‘gentleman’s agreement’’, it was not con-
sistent with the WTO system, which prohibits self-help (7.170).
This is clearly erroneous. If theWTO system prohibited self-help, then it
would prohibit countervailing duty actions against prohibited subsidies.
The panel also suggested that if theOECD Arrangement were incorpor-
ated into the SCM Agreement such as to permit matching of derogations
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of participants, non-participants in the OECD Arrangement would be at
a disadvantage, as they would lack knowledge of such derogations, and
thereby the opportunity for matching them. On the other hand, where
what was being matched was an interest rate permitted under an explicit
exception in the OECD Arrangement, the non-participants would be able
to know what they needed to match, since the explicit exceptions are in a
public document, the Arrangement itself. As Canada attempted to explain
to the panel, this distinction is largely false, because the public document
contains only notice of the theoretical possibility of concessional finan-
cing being offered on the basis of the exceptions in question, but does not
provide information about what might actually be offered in any given
transaction, i.e. the information needed for effective ‘‘matching’’.
In addition, the panel expressed the concern (7.177) that if ‘‘matching’’
of derogations were permitted, and a derogation were taken by a non-
WTOMember, the benchmark for whether a export subsidy was permitted
or not under the WTO rules would be the conduct of that non-Member.
The panel found it unacceptable that the limits of WTO rights could
be determined by non-Members. Nevertheless, the latest version of the
OECDArrangement does not list any non-WTOMembers as participants,
so this concern appears to be entirely hypothetical (in theory, non-WTO
Members could be invited to join the arrangement, however unlikely
this is in the current situation). Moreover, where an export subsidy is
‘‘matching’’ the subsidy of a non-WTO Member, it is difficult to see an
issue arising under the SCM Agreement in the first place, since the non-
WTOMember would not have any standing to challenge the ‘‘matching’’
subsidy. Assume for the sake of argument that Brazil is not a Member of
the WTO – Canada matches Brazil’s alleged derogation from the OECD
Arrangement, but since Brazil has no rights under the SCM Agreement,
nor Canada any obligations towards Brazil, it is not really the case that the
limits of WTO rights and obligations are being determined by the con-
duct of a non-Member.
Of course, Brazil and Canada could be competing hypothetically with a
third country, a WTO Member (let’s say South Africa) for commuter jet
sales. Canada legally matches Brazil’s derogation, and so arguably this
limits in effect its obligation to South Africa under the SCM Agreement.
But doesn’t the same problem arise with respect to matching of an interest
rate explicitly permitted under an exception in the OECD Arrangement,
namely, the conduct of a non-WTOMember, Brazil, triggers a legal right
to match, which limits the rights of South Africa, a WTOMember, under
the SCM Agreement?
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Now it is true that because the exception is explicitly detailed and
circumscribed in the OECD Arrangement, there is a fixed outward
limit, as it were, on how much South Africa’s rights could ultimately be
limited by Brazil’s conduct, which doesn’t so obviously exist in the case
where it is derogations that are matched. This fixed outward limit is itself
however determined in a body participation in which does not haveWTO
Membership as a prerequisite.
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